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IS THE OFFICE CLOSED?
THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AFTER COOPER
V. DISTRICT COURT
RICHARD ALLEN*
In 2001, the State of Alaska reinforced an already strong public
policy in favor of victims’ rights by creating the Office of Victims’
Rights, a state-level agency charged with representing crime
victims in and out of court. However, in an important recent
decision, Cooper v. District Court, the Alaska Court of Appeals
greatly limited the Office of Victim’s Rights’ role in court
proceedings. This Note gives a detailed analysis of the Court of
Appeals’ decision in Cooper and addresses the consequences of
the Cooper decision for the Office of Victim’s Rights. It considers
several possible courtroom roles for the Office of Victim’s Rights
which likely remain legal under Cooper and concludes by
recommending that the Alaska Legislature act to clarify the role of
the Office of Victim’s Rights in the court system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of the history of criminal justice in the United States,
criminal proceedings have been perceived as a transaction between
the offender and the state. Since the 1970s, however, legislators
and other policymakers have paid greater attention to the human
cost of crime and its continuing effects on the lives of crime
1
Crime victims have mounted campaigns to win
victims.
recognition for their concerns, and legislators have responded by

1. See Chief Justice Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The
Proposed Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a
Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
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making efforts to enumerate the rights of crime victims through
statutes and state constitutional amendments.2
States have struggled to decide how to enforce victims’ rights.
Not only do many victims not know their rights, but they are often
unsure of how to assert them, since it is well-established that
3
victims are not parties to criminal proceedings. In sorting through
these issues, crime victims are additionally unsure of where they
may turn for assistance.
Alaska’s legislature took a bold step toward resolving these
uncertainties in 2001 by establishing the Office of Victims’ Rights
to enforce the rights that the Alaska’s Victims’ Rights Statute and
4
the state constitution’s victims’ rights amendment created. The
Office of Victims’ Rights was intended to function as a
comprehensive information clearinghouse for crime victims, an
investigative agency that would examine the procedures of justice
agencies to ensure they protected victims’ rights, and a public
5
interest law firm that would represent victims’ interests in court.
To this end, the statute that created the Office of Victims’ Rights
stated that the Office of Victims’ Rights had “jurisdiction to
6
advocate on behalf of crime victims . . . in the courts of the state.”
The recent Cooper v. District Court decision, however, has
called the Office of Victims’ Rights’ assertion of jurisdiction into
7
question. In Cooper, the Alaska Court of Appeals, construing the
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment for the first time, rejected a
crime victim’s assertion of the right to intervene in the disposition
of a criminal case and the Office of Victims’ Rights’ assertion of
8
independent standing to file suit on behalf of crime victims. Yet,
the court did not state that crime victims were entirely without
9
recourse under Alaska law.
The passage of the Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment
demonstrates a strong public policy in favor of victims’ rights in
Alaska. After Cooper, however, the role of the state’s appointed
victims’ advocate in court proceedings is an open question. How

2. Id. at 5.
3. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 n.6 (1973) (holding that a
crime victim has no cognizable legal interest in the prosecution of his assailant).
4. See Stephen E. Branchflower, The Alaska Office of Victims’ Rights: A
Model For America, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 259, 262–63 (2004).
5. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.65.100–.250 (2006).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a).
7. See Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 711.
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can the Office of Victims’ Rights serve crime victims in court
without running afoul of Cooper?
Part II of this Note offers a brief overview of victims’ rights in
the United States and in Alaska in particular. Part III examines
the reasoning behind the court’s holding in Cooper. Part IV
discusses some strengths and weaknesses of the court’s holding.
Part V investigates several roles for the Office of Victims’ Rights in
the court system that may be permissible under Cooper. It
concludes that the Alaska Legislature should recognize a victim’s
right to address a court and to alert the court to violations of the
victim’s procedural rights, and should offer the Office of Victims’
Rights the opportunity to undertake this task. It further concludes
that pursuing appellate relief is not practical for victims. Part VI
reiterates that the Alaska Legislature should pass legislation to
clearly identify the circumstances under which crime victims may
assert the rights which are justly theirs under the Alaska
constitution.
II. BACKGROUND: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN ALASKA AND
NATIONWIDE
In the 1970s and 1980s, attention began to turn to the role of
the victim in criminal proceedings.10 In the aftermath of such highprofile United States Supreme Court decisions as Gideon v.
11
12
Wainwright and Miranda v. Arizona, which offered new
protections for the rights of the accused, the public began to
perceive a comparative lack of protection for the rights of crime
13
victims. In 1983, the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which
President Ronald Reagan had appointed the previous year, issued
a slate of sixty-eight recommendations that became the basis of
14
many new federal and local programs and policies.
10. See John W. Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence: The Victims’ Right that
Influences Criminal Trials, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV., 231, 235–36 (2001).
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection requires the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of assistance of counsel in criminal trials to be extended to all indigent
defendants in such trials).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that, in criminal cases,
the prosecution may not use statements obtained by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any
significant way without employing safeguards that protect that person’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
13. Stickels, supra note 10, at 236.
14. Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims’ Rights in America: A
Historical Overview (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pg4b.html.
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Many states also responded by passing laws specifically
delineating and protecting the rights of victims. In 1981, Wisconsin
15
was the only state to have a “Victim’s Bill of Rights.” At present,
thirty-two states include provisions for victims’ rights in their state
16
constitutions.
In 1995, the National Victims Constitutional Amendment
Network, a group representing all major victims’ rights
organizations, proposed specific language to be added to the Sixth
Amendment and began an effort to amend the United States
17
A separate
Constitution with provisions for victims’ rights.
victims’ rights amendment to the United States Constitution was
18
first formally proposed in 1996. The proposed amendment was
19
subject to detailed criticism, and different versions of such an
amendment continued to come before the Senate in the following
20
years. For instance, in 2003 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Constitution approved the Crime Victims’ Rights
Constitutional Amendment authored by Senators Jon Kyl and
21
Dianne Feinstein. However, the bill proposing the amendment
was ultimately rewritten as a federal criminal statute and was
22
The law established new procedural
signed into law in 2004.
rights for crime victims similar to those established by state victims’
23
rights constitutional amendments. A victims’ rights amendment
to the United States Constitution has yet to be adopted.

15. Office for Victims of Crime, Paving the Path to Justice (2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pg4a.html.
16. Id.
17. Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the Constitution: Moving from
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1053, 1055 (1998).
18. See Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment on
Victims’ Rights, 1 PUB. PAPERS 976 (June 25, 1996).
19. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States
Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J.
1691, 1692 (1997).
20. See Laura Murphy and Terri Schroeder, American Civil Liberties Union:
Letter to the Senate Urging Opposition to S.J. Res. 1, the “Victims’ Rights
Amendment” (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/victimsrights/10203l
eg20030404.html.
21. See Press Release, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Approves
Kyl/Feinstein Crime Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment (June 12, 2003),
http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Releases/r-vicrights-subcomittee.htm.
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (Supp. V 2005); see also id. at 1–2. The statute secures
for victims:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
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A. The Alaska Victims’ Rights Statute and the Alaska Victims’
Rights Amendment
Alaska first addressed the rights of crime victims in legislation
passed in 1984 entitled “Rights of Victims, Protection of Victims
24
In 1994, voters passed the Alaska Victims’
and Witnesses.”
Rights Amendment, which became section 24 of article I of the
25
Alaska Constitution. In pertinent part, it states that:
Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights
as provided by law: [(1)] the right to be reasonably protected
from the accused through the imposition of appropriate bail or
conditions of release by the court; [(2)] the right to confer with
the prosecution; [(3)] the right to be treated with dignity, respect,
and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice
process; [(4)] the right to timely disposition of the case following
the arrest of the accused; [(5)] the right to obtain information
about and be allowed to be present at all criminal or juvenile
proceedings where the accused has the right to be present; [(6)]
the right to be allowed to be heard, upon request, at sentencing,
before or after conviction or juvenile adjudication, and at any
proceeding where the accused’s release from custody is
considered; [(7)] the right to restitution from the accused; and
[(8)] the right to be informed, upon request, of the accused’s
escape or release from custody before or after conviction or
26
juvenile adjudication.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any
release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence,
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if
the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in
the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy.
Id. at § 3771(a)(1)–(8).
24. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.61.010–.900 (2006).
25. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 261.
26. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24. In discussing the Alaska Victims’ Rights
Amendment, this Note will discuss the rights conferred by the Amendment in
terms of procedural rights and substantive rights. The term “procedural rights”
encompasses: (1) the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of release; (2)
the right to confer; (3) the right to timely disposition of the case; (4) the right to
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B. The Office of Victims’ Rights
In 2001, the 22nd Alaska Legislature created a new agency
called the Office of Victims’ Rights, an agency of the Alaska
Legislature offering legal services to crime victims.27 Since its
creation, the Office of Victims’ Rights has provided its clients with
information, education, investigation, in-court advocacy, and
28
support.
The Office of Victims’ Rights was established as an inspector
general’s office under the Alaska Legislature rather than as an arm
of the executive branch in order to prevent conflicts of interest if
the Office of Victims’ Rights was called upon to investigate
29
criminal justice agencies. Giving the Office of Victims’ Rights
responsibility for the entire spectrum of victims’ rights was also
intended to prevent conflicts of interest which might have arisen if
responsibilities for vindicating certain rights were given to
30
prosecutors, as they are in some states.
The Office of Victims’ Rights was given statutory authority to
adopt its own regulations concerning procedures for advocating on
behalf of crime victims, processing complaints, conducting
investigations, reporting findings, and preventing improper
31
disclosure of information obtained through its investigations. The
agency was also given broad authority to collect information and
was empowered to seek enforcement of information requests in
superior court if individuals or justice agencies failed to comply
32
with its requests. The agency was further given the power to
subpoena individuals to obtain information that might aid in its
33
investigations.

information and the right to be present at all hearings where the accused may be
present; (5) the right to be heard upon request at sentencing and at parole
hearings, etc.; and (6) the right to be informed of the accused’s escape or release.
“Substantive rights” refers to the Amendment’s guarantee of “the right to be
treated with dignity, fairness and respect.”
27. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 263.
28. Id. at 264.
29. Id. at 263.
30. Cf. Gina Warren, Prosecutorial Implications of a Victim’s Right to Be
Heard: Court Upholds Victim’s Right to Be Heard at Important Criminal Justice
Hearings, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1173, 1179–80 (2003) (describing how the Utah
Supreme Court held in a recent case that a prosecutor was responsible for
conveying to the court a victim’s request to be heard at a hearing regarding a
change in plea to a felony charge).
31. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 263.
32. See id. at 271–72.
33. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.130 (2006).
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The Alaska Statutes provide that “[t]he victims’ advocate has
jurisdiction to advocate on behalf of crime victims of felony
34
The Alaska
offenses or class A misdemeanors . . . .”
Administrative Code also outlines procedures by which a victims’
35
advocate can appear before courts in criminal proceedings. These
statutory provisions led the director of the Office of Victims’
Rights to assert in 2004 that:
[B]ecause the legislature recognized that victims’ statutory or
constitutional rights could be deprived during a criminal
prosecution or juvenile proceeding, the legislature granted the
victims’ advocate broad discretion to decide, given the specific
circumstances, whether to participate as an independent
attorney on the victims’ behalf. . . . The Alaska Legislature
specifically authorized the [Office of Victims’ Rights] to
represent crime victims before all state tribunals, at any stage of
the proceedings in criminal cases, in order to ensure that their
36
statutory and constitutional rights are protected and enforced.

III. COOPER V. DISTRICT COURT
A. The Significance of Cooper
Given the broad authority granted to the Office of Victims’
Rights by the Alaska Legislature and Alaska citizens (through a
constitutional amendment), especially with regard to court
proceedings, it was inevitable that the scope of the Office of
Victims’ Rights’ power would come under the Alaska court
system’s scrutiny.
Although the Alaska Victims’ Rights
Amendment was added to the Alaska Constitution in 1994, the
Alaska courts had not construed the amendment prior to Cooper,
making Cooper in some respects a ground-breaking case.
B. Cooper’s Factual Background
Daniel Cooper was initially prosecuted by the Municipality of
37
Daniel
Anchorage for assaulting his wife, Cynthia Cooper.
Cooper pleaded no contest to misdemeanor assault and received a
suspended sentence conditioned on satisfactory completion of one
38
year of probation. Daniel Cooper was required by the conditions
of his probation to attend counseling, but the court did not
specifically require him to attend one of the “batterer’s
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a) (2006).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 20.210(a) (2004).
See Branchflower, supra note 4, at 279–80.
Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
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intervention” programs approved by the Alaska Department of
Corrections.39 The court instead allowed Daniel Cooper to
continue with the counseling program he had been participating in
prior to his sentencing, although the program was not approved by
40
the Department of Corrections.
Both Cynthia Cooper and the Office of Victims’ Rights
challenged Daniel Cooper’s sentence, because the district court
failed to require him to attend a Department of Corrections41
Immediately after
approved batterer’s intervention program.
Daniel Cooper’s sentencing, Cynthia Cooper filed an application
for relief arguing that the counseling portion of Daniel Cooper’s
42
sentence was illegal. She argued that, as the victim of the crime,
she had standing under Alaska law to challenge the sentence
43
The Office of Victims’ Rights
imposed by the district court.
argued that it was independently authorized to appeal Daniel
Cooper’s sentence, whether or not Cynthia Cooper was found to
44
have standing to sue.
C. Victims are Not Parties to Criminal Proceedings
The court began its analysis of the issue of Cynthia Cooper’s
standing by noting that neither the Alaska Constitution nor the
Alaska Victims’ Rights statute expressly granted crime victims the
right to intervene in a criminal case with respect to the charges
45
brought, the sentence requested, or the appeal choices made.
The court further noted that because the prosecutor in the
district court case believed that the judge had the discretion to
decide that Daniel Cooper’s pre-sentencing therapy arrangement
was sufficient to meet the conditions of the sentence, he declined to
46
appeal the sentence on behalf of the Municipality of Anchorage.
Cynthia Cooper’s appeal was thus contrary to the declared interest
of the municipality, since if the sentence were revisited, Daniel
Cooper might move to withdraw from the plea agreement that the
47
municipality had worked to obtain.
The court then considered and rejected Cynthia Cooper’s
arguments that the right to appeal the sentence was implicit in two
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 696–97.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
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rights granted to victims in the Alaska Victims’ Rights
Amendment—the right to a timely disposition of the case and the
48
right to be heard at a sentencing hearing.
D. A Victim’s Right to a Timely Disposition of a Case Is Not
Violated Where the Defendant Has Been Sentenced
In arguing that she had a right to appeal Daniel Cooper’s
sentence, Cynthia Cooper cited appellate court decisions which
49
held that illegal sentences are not meaningfully imposed. Cynthia
Cooper argued that since Daniel Cooper’s sentence was not
meaningfully imposed he was never meaningfully sentenced, thus
50
depriving Cynthia of her right to a timely disposition of the case.
The court flatly rejected this argument, stating that even if an
element of the sentence had been illegal, the fact that Daniel
Cooper had been sentenced to any extent meant that the case had
proceeded in a timely manner within the meaning of the Victims’
51
Therefore, Cynthia Cooper’s right to a
Rights Amendment.
52
timely disposition of the case had not been violated.
E. Victims May Have Standing to Vindicate Procedural Rights
The court next considered Cynthia Cooper’s argument that a
victim’s constitutional right to be heard at sentencing presupposes
a right to appeal if the victim believes the court has imposed an
53
illegal sentence.
Rather than addressing this broader question, the court
examined the record and determined that all of Cynthia Cooper’s
cognizable procedural rights under the Victims’ Rights
Amendment—her rights to receive notice of proceedings, to attend
the proceedings, and to be heard at the proceedings—had been
54
The court found she had received notice of the
vindicated.
proceedings, had attended those proceedings, and had made her
views known to the court, both individually and through her lawyer
55
Since none of Cynthia
from the Office of Victims’ Rights.
Cooper’s procedural rights had been violated, the court stated it
would not decide the question of whether crime victims have

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 700–06.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 701–06.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
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standing to sue to enforce procedural rights under the Alaska
Constitution or the Alaska Victims’ Rights statute.56
Instead, the court decided the narrower question of whether a
victim whose procedural rights have been vindicated has standing
to appeal based solely on her disagreement with the offender’s
57
sentence. The court reviewed a number of state court decisions
from around the country and found that no other state court had
recognized that a victim had standing to appeal in such
58
The court concluded that “the law does not
circumstances.
guarantee crime victims a right to attack the sentencing decision if
the judge fails to adhere to the crime victim’s views regarding the
59
proper sentence.”
F. A Crime Victim’s Constitutional Right to Fairness Does Not
Encompass a Right to Appeal Substantive Decisions by a Trial
Court
In addition to its procedural provisions, the Alaska Victims’
Rights Amendment guarantees crime victims “the right to be
treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the
60
criminal and juvenile justice process.” The court rejected Cynthia
Cooper’s argument that the amendment’s guarantee of fairness
“must encompass the right to insist on enforcement of all of the
provisions of the Alaska Statutes that speak to the interests of
61
In doing so, the court cited recent legislative
crime victims.”
history, noting that the legislature had taken no action on a bill that
would have granted crime victims broad rights to petition courts to
62
vindicate their constitutional and statutory rights. Instead, the
legislature had passed more modest measures securing crime
victims only one specific right—the right to appeal sentences that,
due to mitigating factors, were reduced below the presumptive
63
sentencing range for the crime in question. The court concluded
that the legislature had chosen not to grant victims either
independent party status or “an extensive independent right to
64
litigate.”

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 702–03.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 706.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24.
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 708–09.
Id. at 709 (discussing H.B. 55, § 3, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005)).
Id. (discussing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(f) (2006)).
Id. at 709.
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G. The Office of Victims’ Rights Does Not Have Independent
Standing to File Suit on Behalf of Crime Victims
Despite the Office of Victims’ Rights’ mandate to “assist crime
victims in obtaining the rights [that] crime victims are
65
guaranteed,” the Cooper court was unwilling to separate the
Office of Victims’ Rights’ role in court proceedings from that of the
crime victim, stating that, even if an attorney is employed by a
public agency, “the attorney’s authority to file a lawsuit is merely
66
an extension of the client’s authority to do so.” The court instead
concluded that the legislature intended the Office of Victims’
67
68
Rights’ authority to “advocate” and “assist” to extend only to
the Office’s express authority to “publicly criticize a government
agency if the Office believes that the agency has violated a crime
69
victim’s rights.” Therefore, the Office of Victim’s Rights cannot
advocate and assist a victim in exercising rights the victim does not
70
have.
H. The Office of Victims’ Rights is Analogous to the Office of the
Ombudsman
The Cooper court noted that the Office of Victims’ Rights’
statutory investigative and reportorial duties are analogous to
those of another state agency, the Office of the Ombudsman, which
is empowered to investigate and report on state government offices
71
if it appears a citizen has been treated unfairly or unreasonably.
The court concluded that because the provisions creating the two
agencies were similar, “the legislature intended the Office of
Victims’ Rights to act as a special ombudsman in the area of
72
The court further reasoned that since the
victims’ rights.”
legislature did not expressly give the Office of the Ombudsman
independent ability to intervene in a criminal proceeding or to
appeal its result, the legislature did not intend to give the Office of
73
Victims’ Rights that ability either. The court cited the Model
Ombudsman Act for State Governments as additional authority for

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.110(a) (2006).
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 712.
ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a).
Id.
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 712.
Id.
Id. at 713–14.
Id.
Id.
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its conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights does not have
independent ability to intervene or appeal.74
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE COURT’S HOLDING IN COOPER
A. The Role of the Office of Victims’ Rights’ Is Not Analogous to
that of the State Ombudsman
There are clear justifications for the court’s insistence on
limiting the reach of the Office of Victims’ Rights to the
ombudsman-like powers established under statute. Primary among
them, as the court indicated, is the victim’s third-party status which
leaves the victims’ advocate, despite his mandate to advocate on
the part of the victim, without a clear role in the courtroom. Under
this view, implicit in Cooper, it is the court’s job to enforce victims’
rights laws governing trial procedure as much as it is to enforce any
other state law, The Office of Victims’ Rights would better serve
the citizens of Alaska by monitoring the justice system for abuses
of victims’ rights and reporting violations of the system to the
executive branch and to the public rather than sending victims’
advocates to trial and forcing individual judges to decide what role
they may or may not play. Implicit in this determination is the
possibility that any unprecedented intervention in court
proceedings by the victims’ advocate or the crime victim could
jeopardize a conviction or give a defendant additional grounds for
appeal. Such an outcome would certainly be contrary to the
victim’s interests. It is highly unlikely that a victim would chance
75
seeing an offender go free merely to enforce a procedural right.
Even so, it does not follow from the structure of the
amendment and statutes that the Alaska Legislature primarily
intended the Office of Victims’ Rights to play the role of an
ombudsman. The most obvious criticism of the Cooper court’s
conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights’ authority is strictly
analogous to that of the Office of the Ombudsman is that there is a
clear distinction between the clientele of the Office of the
Ombudsman, which works on behalf of a broad range of citizens
76
who have been treated “unfairly or unreasonably,” and that of the

74. Id. at 713 (Under the terms of the Model Act, “the ombudsman has no
power to coerce government agencies to take action, nor the power to sue
government agencies in court . . . .”).
75. See Nikki Morton, Cleaning Salt From the Victim’s Wound: Mandamus as
a Remedy for the Denial of a Victim’s Right of Allocution, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 89, 96 (Fall 2000).
76. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 713.
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Office of Victims’ Rights, which is limited to those who have been
victims of serious crimes—felonies or first-degree misdemeanors.77
Given that the Office of the Ombudsman’s scope of operation
may not encompass criminal proceedings at all, and the Office of
Victims’ Rights’ scope of operation explicitly includes criminal
78
proceedings, it does not follow from the fact that the Office of the
Ombudsman does not have the authority to intervene in criminal
proceedings that the Office of Victims’ Rights also lacks such
authority. The legislature may well have expected that the task of
enforcing these citizens’ rights might involve circumstances of
greater urgency or seriousness and would be undertaken with an
eye towards the wrongs the victims had already suffered. Being
wronged by a criminal court is different from being wronged by
another state agency, especially when, in order to come within the
court’s purview, one has already had to have been wronged by an
offender.
B. Dangers of Denying the Office of Victims’ Rights a Role in
Court Proceedings
Fundamental grounds for a courtroom role for the Office of
Victims’ Rights may be found in the fact that several of the
constitutional rights the Office is charged with protecting directly
involve court proceedings, for instance: (1) the right to confer with
the prosecution, (2) the right to be present at all criminal or
juvenile proceedings where the accused has the right to be present,
and (3) the right to be heard upon request in instances such as post79
trial sentencing and parole hearings. Such rights cannot be fully
enforced retroactively. If a crime victim is denied the right to be
heard at sentencing and the offender is sentenced, that denial of
rights cannot be rectified at a later date. If a crime victim is
excluded from a trial, that victim will not have another opportunity
to be present at that trial. A later investigation and a report by the
Office of Victims’ Rights cannot protect that victim’s rights—it can
only serve to prod the courts to do a better job of protecting the
rights of other victims in the future.
If the Office of Victims’ Rights were allowed to intervene
during court proceedings, it is possible that certain rights belonging
to the victim which otherwise would have been violated could be
fully protected. The impossibility of fully enforcing these rights
retroactively is what led the director of the Office of Victims’

77. ALASKA STAT. § 24.65.100(a) (2006).
78. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 20.210(a) (2002).
79. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24.

05__ALLEN.DOC

2007]

12/17/2007 11:32:48 AM

VICTIMS’ RIGHTS

277

Rights to conclude, prior to Cooper, that “the legislature
recognized that victims’ statutory or constitutional rights could be
deprived during a criminal prosecution [and] granted the victims’
advocate . . . discretion . . . to participate as an independent
80
attorney on the victims’ behalf.”
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AFTER COOPER
A. How May Crime Victims Enforce Rights?
The aftermath of Cooper has left the Office of Victims’ Rights
striving to determine its proper role at trial. The Office of Victims’
Rights’ annual report for 2006 notes that:
[T]he fallout from the Cooper decision has been extremely
problematical. Many judges and defense counsel around the
state have used the decision to deprive the Office of Victims’
Rights from filing documents, from being able to be present by
phone for hearings, from speaking at hearings, and in some
cases, the office’s attorney’s presence is not even being
81
acknowledged by the court.

Yet Alaska law clearly states that “[t]he right to
representation includes the bringing of an action on behalf of a
crime victim when, in the judgment of the victims’ advocate, the
action will protect and advance the crime victim’s statutory and
82
constitutional victim rights.” The Alaska Code was annotated
83
after Cooper to clarify that the Office of Victims’ Rights does not
have “an independent right to file lawsuits that the victims
84
themselves could not file.” Although it recognizes this restriction,
the Office of Victims’ Rights has asserted that the court’s holding
85
The Office of
in Cooper does not rule out all suits entirely.
Victims’ Rights’ position remains that when crime victims’ legal
rights are violated, they are entitled to “limited standing,” which is
distinct from party status, but which allows the crime victims to

80. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 279.
81. MARY ANNE HENRY, THE OFFICE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE 10 (2006), http://www.officeofvictimsrights.legis.state.ak.
us/ovrdocuments/2006_ANNUAL_REPORT.pdf.
82. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 20.210(a) (2002).
83. Act of June 16, 2006, ch. 74, § 1, 2006 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. P*1
(LexisNexis).
84. Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 712 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
85. Henry, supra note 81, at 22 (“[Crime victims and the Office of Victims’
Rights] simply wish to exercise their right to limited standing to address violations
of their constitutional and statutory rights. The Cooper decision does NOT
prohibit this.”).
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present their rights in court even in the absence of express
provisions allowing them to do so.86
Given the limitations placed upon the Office of Victims’
Rights by the Cooper holding, questions remain for both crime
victims and the Office of Victims’ Rights, whose mission is to assist
those victims. What lawsuits can victims file? Are there other
avenues crime victims may pursue in court in order to enforce
procedural rights?
Part B will examine three possibilities which have been
employed to differing extents outside of Alaska courts. Part C will
then briefly address the significance of the substantive rights of
dignity, respect, and fairness for crime victims provided by the
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment.
B. Possible Ways for Alaska Crime Victims to Enforce Their
Procedural Rights
Three possibilities which have been employed to differing
extents outside of Alaska include: (1) opportunities to address the
court to alert it to a violation of a procedural right, (2) petitions for
appellate relief after violations of victims’ procedural rights, and
(3) petitions for writs of mandamus.
1. Can Victims Address the Court to Alert it to Procedural
Violations? One of the amici curiae in Cooper, the Victim
Advocacy Research Group, cited a case from the Supreme Judicial
87
Court of Massachusetts, Hagen v. Commonwealth, as support for
its position that the court in that case had recognized a crime
88
The Cooper court strongly rejected this
victim’s standing.
argument stating that the Hagen court did not grant crime victims
the right to “independently challenge the rulings of the trial court,”
but instead merely “[suggested] that crime victims have the right to
personally address the trial judge before the judge makes decisions
that involve any of the rights guaranteed under the Massachusetts
89
Victims’ Rights Act.”
The right granted to victims to address the judge in such
circumstances in Massachusetts under Hagen may be similar in
practice to the “limited standing” for which the Office of Victims’
Rights has argued. In Hagen, the crime victim was allowed by the
trial judge to alert the court through a representative to the matter

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
772 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. 2002).
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 704.
Id. at 705.
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of a long delay in the disposition of the offender’s case.90
According to the Hagen court, when the remedy for a violation of a
victim’s right (here, the right to a prompt disposition) is one only a
court can provide, the victim should have the right to address and
91
alert the court of the violation of the victim’s rights.
This decision presents a possible solution to the problem of
enforcing victims’ rights that are implicitly tied to court
proceedings. The victim is still not a party and cannot compel the
court to act on the victim’s behalf. Discretion still remains with the
court. The victim, however, would be given leave to alert the court
to a violation of rights, giving the court the opportunity to consider
a course of action that would address the violation during the court
proceedings, rather than leaving it to an agency such as the Office
of Victims’ Rights to issue a report after the fact. The Office of
92
Victims’ Rights’ use of the term “limited standing” in asserting
this right may decrease the likelihood of recognition of this right.
As the term suggests, this right would be a species of standing
rather than an informational gesture by the crime victim for the
court’s benefit, an occurrence in the proceedings somewhat
analogous to the presentation of the victim impact statement at
sentencing.
The fact that the Cooper court did not reject the central
holding of Hagen suggests that it is possible that the Office of
Victims’ Rights could be empowered to act similarly to alert courts
on behalf of its clients without running afoul of the settled principle
that victims are never parties to criminal proceedings. The Alaska
Legislature should remove confusion surrounding this issue by
establishing a clearly limited right for victims to inform the court of
violations of procedural rights, leaving the court with full discretion
over how to redress the violation in question.
2. Can Victims Seek Appellate Relief if Procedural Rights are
Violated? The Cooper court stated that “the executive branch of
government (as the representative of the community) has the sole
responsibility and authority to initiate and litigate criminal cases—
and, if necessary, to challenge a trial court’s decisions by seeking
93
appellate review.” In its review of state court decisions from
around the country, however, the Cooper court noted that among
the states with victims’ rights amendments, “many courts are
prepared to recognize a crime victim’s standing to sue for
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Hagen, 772 N.E.2d at 38.
Henry, supra note 81, at 22.
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 710.
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enforcement of the procedural rights granted by the victims’ rights
act—the rights to notice, to attend court proceedings, and to offer
their views on certain decisions (especially sentencing and parole
94
release).”
In fact, other states have been even more generous in
recognizing a crime victim’s right to sue to enforce an entire range
of rights. In 2002, for example, the Utah Supreme Court concluded
in State v. Casey that “(1) . . . crime victims possess the right to
appeal rulings on motions related to their rights as a victim and (2)
95
that an appellate court must review appeals of such a nature.”
Utah’s Rights of Crime Victims Act provides that a crime victim
can sue an individual acting under color of state law as well as the
state entity which employs that individual if the individual willfully
96
or wantonly fails to act to protect the victim’s rights. However,
other state courts have not been as generous in granting crime
victims the right to appeal. In Cianos v. State, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland affirmed a judgment of a lower court holding that
crime victims could not appeal the trial court’s decision not to
allow them to speak at an offender’s sentencing because they were
97
not parties to the proceeding.
The Cooper court declined to decide the question of possible
appellate relief, stating that “we leave for another day the question
of whether a crime victim in Alaska has the right to seek appellate
relief when a lower court fails to honor a crime victim’s procedural
98
rights.” The Alaska Court of Appeals also declined to decide the
99
issue in a recent order, Kalenka v. Volland, in which it refused to
grant an application for relief filed with the court of appeals by the
father of a murder victim alleging the denial of his constitutional
right to a prompt disposition of the charges. Despite its denial of
relief, the court declined to decide the issue of whether crime
100
victims can file motions at the trial court level.

94. Id. at 705.
95. 44 P.3d 756, 762 (Utah 2002) (holding that the victim had both a statutory
right under the Rights of Crime Victims Act and a state constitutional right under
the Utah Constitution’s victims’ rights amendment to be heard at a change of plea
hearing for a felony charge, which was held to be an “important criminal justice
hearing” within the language of both the statute and the amendment).
96. Warren, supra note 30, at 1177–78.
97. 659 A.2d 291, 293–94 (Md. Ct. App. 1995).
98. Cooper, 133 P.3d at 711.
99. Court of Appeals Order Denying Kalenka’s Original Application for
Relief at 4, No. A-09575 (Apr. 25, 2006).
100. Henry, supra note 81, at 25.
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The Cooper court clearly rejected the suggestion that victims
could appeal if the court declined to follow a victim’s or a victim
advocate’s independent conclusions about the facts of a case or
101
suggestions about how to dispose of a case. A clear violation of a
victim’s procedural rights during court proceedings, however,
might present grounds for appeal. This possibility, again, raises
practical considerations about how violations of procedural rights
could actually be redressed were the victim to win on appeal. Such
difficulties are clear in the facts surrounding the Kalenka order;
even if the court of appeals had found that the trial court had
violated the victim’s right to a prompt disposition of the charges by
the time the court had heard the appeal, the date of the murder
trial, which had been postponed for four months, was only thirty102
five days away.
Cianos similarly provides useful perspective on the
shortcomings of appellate relief for crime victims. The crime
victims’ application for leave to appeal makes clear the extent of
the remedy they had hoped for: the vacating of the offender’s
103
The
sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
grounds for the Cianos court’s decision are also instructive. Rather
than deciding the issue of whether the crime victims had effectively
been denied their right to address the court, the court of appeals
found that a decision on the merits could have no practical bearing
on the case. Even if the victims had appealed a decision of the
court prior to sentencing, they could not have stayed the
104
proceeding.
Given these examples of the inability of the court system to
grant meaningful relief to crime victims seeking to appeal
violations of procedural rights, a right to appeal procedural
violations will likely not be useful to Alaska crime victims.
3. May Victims Petition Courts of Appeal for Writs of
Mandamus? Early in its opinion, in considering the issue of a
victim’s standing to challenge a plea bargain agreement, the
105
Cooper court cited a passage from Reed v. Becka, a South
Carolina Supreme Court case which held that in South Carolina
106
constitutional rights may be enforced via a writ of mandamus.
The Cooper court noted that:
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Cooper, 133 P.3d at 705–06.
See Henry, supra note 81, at 24–25.
Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 292 (Md. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 293–94.
511 S.E.2d 396 (S.C. 1999).
Cooper, 133 P.3d at 704.
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[S]ome courts have recognized a crime victim’s right to pursue
litigation seeking relief in the nature of mandamus (i.e., an
appellate court order directing a lower court to follow the law)
when a lower court fails to honor the procedural rights given to
crime victims by state constitution
or by state statute. This issue
107
is not raised in the present case.

Could writs of mandamus be used in Alaska courts to enforce
victims’ procedural rights? Alaska’s rules of civil procedure no
108
Instead,
longer technically recognize the writ of mandamus.
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 91 provides that “[r]elief
heretofore available by mandamus as prescribed by statutes may be
obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the
109
practice prescribed in these rules.” Alaska courts thus recognize
actions to compel civil courts to enforce the law which resemble
mandamus; although mandamus is infrequently employed in a
110
criminal law setting, there is no indication that courts would not
similarly recognize such actions in criminal proceedings.
Precedent indicates that the Alaska Legislature may
statutorily approve additional petitions for review for crime victims
that in other states would be characterized as petitions for writs of
mandamus. An Alaska Court of Appeals decision referred to a
“petition for writ of mandate” (equivalent to a writ of mandamus)
filed in the California Court of Appeal as “the equivalent of our
111
The one instance in which the Alaska
petition for review.”
Legislature has specifically recognized a crime victim’s ability to
pursue an action in court—when an offender has been sentenced
below the sentencing range for the crime—refers to the prospective
112
action as a “petition for review.” Accordingly, the situations in
which crime victims in other states may pursue mandamus as a
remedy are relevant to this discussion.
Crime victims have petitioned for writs of mandamus to
compel courts to enforce procedural rights in other forums with
113
varying degrees of success. In United States v. McVeigh, family
members of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing
unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandamus in federal court in
an attempt to compel the district court judge to allow them to be
107. Id. at 711.
108. ALASKA R. CIV. PROC. 91 (2006).
109. Id.
110. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 21 (2006).
111. DeNardo v. Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1099–1100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (2006) (“The victim of the crime for which a
defendant has been convicted and sentenced may file a petition for review in an
appellate court of a sentence that is below the sentencing range for the crime.”).
113. 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997).
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present at all public court hearings regarding the case.114 Recently,
115
however, in Kenna v. United States District Court, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus to a victim
who had been denied the right to speak in open court at an
offender’s sentencing; the court found that he had been denied his
right to be “reasonably heard” under the federal Crime Victims’
116
Rights Act and remanded the case back to district court.
Mandamus is a flexible equitable remedy. Given those
qualities, the fact that the Cooper court declined to rule out
mandamus as a remedy means it may be a future avenue for
obtaining equitable relief for violations of procedural rights in
court proceedings. The holding in Kenna supports this analysis.
However, mandamus is regarded as an extraordinary remedy, one
117
Crime victims are not entirely deprived of
of “last resort.”
grounds for a petition for review, which undercuts the need for an
extraordinary remedy.
The Alaska Legislature has so far
recognized one basis for a petition for review—where a sentence
falls below a mandatory sentencing range. It is thus possible that
after Cooper, Alaska courts will recognize only that basis for
review under Alaska Statute section 24.65.210. The issue may be
clarified soon. In 2005, a bill was introduced in the Alaska
Legislature which would create a statute giving crime victims the
right to file petitions for review and to appeal the court’s decisions
118
regarding those petitions. At the time of the Cooper decision, the
119
legislature had yet to act on the bill.
C. How Will the Right to Dignity, Fairness, and Respect be
Protected Under the Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment?
In addition to procedural rights, the Alaska Victims’ Rights
Amendment gives crime victims the substantive right to be treated
120
with “dignity, respect and fairness.” Alaska is not alone in doing
so; fifteen other states’ victims’ rights amendments also use these
terms, and eight of those states statutorily define one or more of
121
these terms.
114. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 517 (1999).
115. 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006).
116. Id. at 1018. The court also ruled that “reasonably heard” means the victim
has a right to speak in open court. Id. at 1015.
117. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Mandamus § 4 (2006).
118. H.B. 55, § 3, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005).
119. Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 709 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
120. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24.
121. Branchflower, supra note 4, at 262.
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Some courts in other states have employed similar guarantees
of these substantive rights to provide context for interpreting other
rights of victims. Recently, in State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme
Court found that the Idaho victims’ rights amendment’s guarantees
of dignity, respect, and fairness, combined with specific statutory
provisions for restitution for crime victims, demonstrated a strong
public policy against allowing abatement ab initio of charges
against a defendant who had been convicted of kidnapping but
122
123
died before his appeal was heard. In Salt Lake City v. Johnson,
the Utah Court of Appeals also invoked Utah’s constitutional
“Declaration of the Rights of Victims” and its guarantee of
“fairness, respect, and dignity” in affirming the decision of a trial
court to dismiss a domestic violence charge at the request of the
crime victim despite the opposition of the municipality of Salt Lake
124
In Cianos, even though the Maryland Court of Appeals
City.
concluded that crime victims did not have standing to appeal after
a possible violation of the right to be heard at sentencing, the court
cited Maryland’s crime victims’ bill of rights’ guarantee of “dignity,
respect and sensitivity” as support for the proposition that “trial
judges must give appropriate consideration to the impact of crime
125
The Cianos court thus made the equitable
upon the victims.”
determination that because the crime victims had arguably been
denied a statutory right, they would be relieved of the
126
responsibility of the court costs of their appeal.
Not all state courts have concluded that these guarantees
apply in the same circumstances. In a case with facts similar to
Korsen, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Crime
Victims’ Rights Amendment’s guarantee of “fairness and respect
for [victims’] dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
127
process” was not relevant, and that the amendment had “neither
application nor reference to the abatement of criminal
128
prosecutions.”
The Cooper court rejected Cynthia Cooper’s assertion that the
Alaska Victims’ Rights Amendment’s guarantee of fairness
granted crime victims the right to override the discretion of the
trial court and insist upon enforcement of all other applicable
victims’ rights provisions. Aside from Cooper, there have been no
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 134–35 (Idaho 2005).
959 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1023.
Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 295 (Md. Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1).
People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999).
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other cases construing the meaning of these terms in Alaska.129
Whether Alaska courts will choose to view the guarantee of
“dignity, respect, and fairness” as merely a statement of ideals or as
an enforceable right with practical applications has not yet been
decided. As in Korsen and Cianos, these words should serve as a
further reminder to judges of Alaska’s strong public policy in favor
of victims’ rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cooper represents an important definition of the landscape of
victims’ rights in Alaska. The Office of Victims’ Rights will
continue to play a unique role as a state agency, but the Alaska
Court of Appeals has made clear that the Office of Victims’ Rights’
standing to intervene in criminal proceedings is no different than
that of any other third party. Further, the court clearly and
concretely stated its conclusion that the Office of Victims’ Rights is
intended primarily to play the role of an ombudsman. Although
this conclusion is not authoritative, it has already had consequences
for the day-to-day operations of the Office of Victims’ Rights, as
noted in Part V.
The doors of the court are not completely closed to crime
victims in Alaska. As discussed above, opportunities may remain
for victims to address trial courts to alert those courts to procedural
violations, to seek appellate relief for violations of procedural
rights, and to file petitions for writs of mandamus.
The first avenue, leave to alert courts to violations, is the most
promising, as it would allow victims to assert their rights at trial
without interfering with the discretion of the court. Accordingly,
the Alaska Legislature should remove confusion surrounding this
issue by establishing a clearly limited right for victims to inform the
court of violations of procedural rights.
Appellate relief for procedural violations raises substantial
procedural difficulties, chief among them the high likelihood that
many issues would be mooted before appeals could be pursued,
making appeal a comparatively unattractive means of redress.
The possibility of Alaska courts granting petitions for writs of
mandamus cannot be ruled out as a last resort. A possible new
statute outlining grounds by which crime victims could petition for
review is before the legislature, but the legislature has yet to act on
it.
The Alaska Legislature went to great lengths to establish the
statutory and constitutional rights of crime victims under state law.
129. Id. at 709.
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By establishing the Office of Victims’ Rights, it became a leader in
victims’ rights education and evidenced a strong commitment to
ensuring that victims’ rights would be protected by all the agencies
of state government. But the issue of how victims’ rights will be
enforced in court remains open. The legislature should do crime
victims the favor of clarifying the means by which these important
rights will be enforced.

